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1.  Introduction 
 
The Isthmus of Panama has exploited its privileged geographical location since the times of 
Christopher  Columbus’  third  voyage  in  1502-1504  and  the  “discovery”  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean by Vasco Núñez de Balboa in 1513. From the early colonial land routes, to the 
construction of the railroad (completed in 1855) and the opening of the Canal in 1914, 
Panama’s geography has been its greatest comparative advantage.
2  
 
Modern  day  Panama  is  a  relatively  small  country  in  terms  of  area  (75,517  squared 
kilometers), population (slightly over 3.3 million in 2006), and GDP (US$17 billion in 
2006). Since its independence from Colombia in 1903, the Canal and the heavy influence of 
the U.S. have been the major forces in Panama’s development process. Between 1903 and 
1979 the U.S. exercised absolute control over the Panama Canal Zone (an area of 1,400 
km
2)  and  had  rights  to  intervene  militarily  in  the  country.  Since  December  31,  1999 
Panama  assumed  full  control  of the  Canal’s  operations  (although  the  U.S. retained  the 




Panama has a fully dollarized economy. Its main economic pillars have been the Canal –
today in the hands of the Panama Canal Authority (PCA), the Colon Free Zone (CFZ), and 
the  Financial  Banking  Center  (FBC).  According  to  the  2006  data,  GDP  shares  are  19 
percent  in  transport  and  communications  (mostly  the  Canal  and  ports),  8  percent  in 
financial intermediation, and 15 percent in commerce (including the CFZ). As a result of 
                                                             
1 Paper prepared for the Inter-American Development  Bank’s project on Competitiveness and Growth  in 
Latin America. We would like to thank Manuel Agosín, Daniel Artana, Marco Fernández, Fidel Jaramillo, 
Osmel  Manzano,  Peter  Montiel,  Ernesto  Stein,  and  participants  of  seminars  at  Fedesarrollo,  IADB,  and 
INDESA (Panama) for valuable comments and suggestions. We benefited from conversations with Nicolás 
Ardito-Barletta, Guillermo Chapman, and Juan Luis Moreno-Villalaz. Oscar Becerra and Carlos Felipe Prada 
provided excellent research assistance.   
2 Panama’s colonization began in 1510 as a settlement (called then Santa María la Antigua) of about three 
hundred Spaniards, led from 1511 by Vasco Núñez de Balboa (in 1513, searching for gold, they found a new 
ocean).  The city of Panama was founded in 1519, where ten percent of the initial inhabitants were non-
Spaniards (“foreigners” have played a significant role in the country). After the encounter between Pizarro 
and Atahualpa in 1532, silver from Potosí was taken to Panama where it crossed by land and river to Nombre 
de Dios to be embarked to the Old World. This is how Panama became important for world trade, and world 
trade became critical for Panama.  
3 Between 1979 and 1999, canal operations where in the hands of the Panama Canal Commission (a joint 
U.S.-Panama agency). this  economic  structure,  services  represent  76  percent  of  Panama’s  GDP  (1991-2003). 
Although the three pillars account for 42 percent of GDP, their employment contributions 
are much smaller.  
 
According to labor market statistics, total employment was 1.21 million in 2006 (the labor 
force was 1.32 million indicating a 9.1 percent unemployment rate). Employment figures in 
Transport and Communications and Banking are modest: 91,802 (7.6 percent of the total) 
and 26,034 (2.0 percent), respectively. The fact that these activities represent 26.7 percent 
of the GDP and account for only 9.6 percent of the employment, contrast with agriculture 
which has a 7.2 percent share in the total GDP, but represents 19.6 percent of the total 
employment. In turn, 15.6 percent of employment is in the public sector. These differences 
are indicative of an unbalanced growth pattern, characteristic of a dual economy with sharp 
productivity differentials across sectors. In other words, the more modern services-based 
economy  coexists  with  a  relatively  backward  labor-intensive  agricultural  and  industrial 
economy.  
 
Annual GDP growth between 1990 and 2003 was on average 5 percent (3 percent in per 
capita  terms),  a  relatively  high  rate  for  Latin  American  standards.  However,  when 
compared to other entrepôt centers such as Hong Kong and Singapore (both former British 
colonies) and to Puerto Rico (also dollarized and strongly influenced by the U.S.), growth 
performance is less impressive (see Table 1)
4.  
 
More recent growth outcomes in Panama have been remarkable. GDP growth in 2006 was 
8.1 percent and accelerated to 9.4 percent in the first quarter of 2007. Most analysts project 
growth  rates  between  8  and  9  percent  until  2010.  High  growth  will  be  result  of  the 
expansion of the Canal (approved by a referendum on October 22, 2006) at an estimated 
cost of $5.3 billion (30 percent of its current GDP). Also, the economy will be further 
stimulated by high growth in residential and non-residential construction (which grew 17.4 
percent in 2006), as well as robust growth in the FBC and the CFZ.
5   
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Panama’s growth strategy in light of the growth 
diagnostics methodology (GDM) developed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2004). A 
thorough application of GDM requires more data than is available for Panama, especially in 
terms of factor prices and business surveys. Even if formal testing is not always feasible, 
GDM provides a careful and organized discussion of all possible constrains on growth. In 
particular, the methodology is of great interest value to understand why other service-based 
economies -such as Hong Kong- have been more dynamic than Panama, and why some 
sectors have lagged within the country.  
 
                                                             
4 The parallel between Panama and Singapore is particularly appealing because Britain withdrew of all its 
military forces in Singapore in the 1970s. British military bases are estimated to have accounted for 13-20 
percent of Singapore’s GDP (16 percent of employment) at the time. However, policies in Singapore have 
involved  wide  state  participation  in  economic  matters  thorough  forced  savings,  the  role  of  development 
banks, and the so-called ‘industrial-targeting’. In Panama, as in Hong Kong, policies have been more laissez 
faire at least in the “modern” sectors. See Young (1992). 
5 In recent years, growth  in GDP has been higher  than  in GNP (a difference over 5 percentage points), 
suggesting that foreign investment is playing a prominent role. Although  the  old-development  theorists’  arguments  in  favor  of  ‘balanced  growth’  (i.e. 
proportional growth in all outputs) are no longer generally accepted, it is still important to 
underscore  the  problems  associated  with  low  growth  in  the  less  modern  sectors  of  an 
economy.
6  This  is  particularly  true  if  those  sectors  play  an  important role  in  the  labor 
market. More specifically, the current development strategy, which puts enormous weight 
on  the  Canal’s  expansion,  runs  the  risk  of  reinforcing  the  pattern  of  duality.  Thus, 
understanding  what  constrains  the  backward  and  more  labor  intensive  sectors  of  the 
economy,  and  providing  policy  recommendations  to  accelerate  their  growth,  has  a 
potentially sizeable payoff. 
 
In this context, the objective of the paper is to propose a set of recommendations on what 
needs to be done in order to assure success of the current growth strategy. We have no 
doubts on the value of strengthening Panama’s geographical comparative advantage with 
the Canal’s expansion. The key question is to identify the additional steps which could 
promote growth in the non-canal economy. In addition to making growth more sustainable, 
growth acceleration in the traditional sectors can result in a reduction of inequality, which 
is extremely high in Panama. 
 
To answer these questions the paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 discusses 
some  key  features  of  Panama’s  economic  structure  that  are  important  for  the  analysis. 
Section 3 analyzes Panama’s growth using conventional techniques. In particular, we look 
at the role of the ‘fundamental’ determinants of growth, such as institutions, geography, 
and  human  capital.  Also,  the  time  series  analysis  shows  that  growth  has  experienced 
reversals while a standard sources-of-growth decomposition suggests that Panama has a 
severe productivity problem. Sections 4 to 8 deal with the GDM. Section 4 presents some 
general  evidence  from  the  Investment  Climate  Survey  (ICS)  on  the  main  concerns  of 
Panama’s entrepreneurs. Section 5 discusses all the problems that could imply low social 
returns to investment. Section 6 analyzes the issues related to problems of appropriability.  
Section  7  introduces  the  problems  of  self-discovery,  and  Section  8  looks  at  financing 
issues. Section 9 concludes. 
 
 




As mentioned in the introduction, the Canal is the key pillar of the economy, not only as a 
result of its direct contribution to output, but also because it is a large hub for the supply of 
services, such as insurance, maintenance and professional services.  
 
The Canal has a relatively large impact on external and fiscal accounts. In terms of the 
Balance of Payments, net exports of services from the Canal were close to US$1 billion 
(2006). This is approximately equal to the value of Panama’s total exports of goods (and 
three times net exports from the Colon Free Zone). In fiscal terms, transfers to the Central 
Government take three forms: i.) A fee per net tonnage; ii.) A fee for the utilization of 
                                                             
6 Nurkse (1953) is perhaps the most well-known advocate of balanced growth or diversification in output.  public utilities by the PCA (especially water and electricity), and iii.) An annual dividend as 
the government is the only shareholder of the PCA
7. In addition, the central government 
directly withholds a fraction of the salaries of the PCA employees (this last item represents 
around 0.5 percent of GDP). According to Figure 1, the Canal’s contributions to the central 
government have increased significantly since 2000, reaching 3.5 percent of GDP in 2006 
(three  times  more  than  during  the  1990s  on  average),  but  still  well  below  the  fiscal 
dependency on natural resources in other countries, such as Venezuela or Ecuador.
8  
 
The recent positive trend in revenues reflects that, while the U.S. administration sought to 
recover  costs,  the  PCA  has  generated  profits  and  is  increasing  its  contribution  to  the 
Panamanian government. The PCA has increased efficiency by reducing employment and 
controlling operational expenses, while traffic (in net tonnage) has increased by more than 
5 percent per year. Also, tolls and fees for transit services have increased since 2002, and 
will continue to increase in the following years.
9  
 
Anticipating the Canal’s expansion, which will require borrowing, the government decided 
in September 2004 to exclude the balance of the PCA from the fiscal accounts. The PCA is 
commercially run, its budget is not subject to the provisions of the government’s budget 
law,  the  use  of  its  revenues  or  assets  to  guarantee  government  debt  is  constitutionally 
prohibited  (Art.  315).  Furthermore,  its  board  is  not  completely  controlled  by  the 
government. However, the IMF has expressed concerns over the decision to exclude the 
PCA  from  the  fiscal  accounts  because  large  additional  borrowing  by  the  PCA  can 
compromise the sustainability of public debt.  
 
Colon’s Free Zone (CFZ) 
 
In 1948, when the city of Colon was suffering from the reduction in military activities in 
the  Canal  Zone  after  WWII,  the  government  created  the  CFZ  as  a  center  for  the 
transshipment  of  merchandises.
10  The  CFZ  is  largest  free  trade  zone  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere, and is the second largest in the world, after Hong Kong. Its installations, an 
area of 400 hectares, are operated by a public entity that charges rental and service fees to 
business operating as wholesale importers and re-exporters, distributors for multinational 
                                                             
7 Since 2000, when the Canal was fully transferred to Panamanian ownership. 
8 This contribution is significant, but well below the  average rent received form oil in countries such as 
Venezuela and Ecuador. In this sense, the Natural Resource Curse arguments lose some relevance for the case 
of Panama. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), analyzing the case of Nigeria, argue that “some natural 
resources  –  oil  and  minerals  in  particular  –  exert  a  negative  and  nonlinear  impact  on  growth  via  their 
deleterious impact on institutional quality.” Other channels, such as the ‘Dutch disease’ (or real appreciation 
of the currency), are also absent in the case of Panama, as we will discuss below. 
9 In February 2007, the ACP announced a plan for increases in tolls in 2007-2009. The Cabinet approved a 
diluted version which, nonetheless, will raise tolls by 13.7 percent (annually) in the case of container carriers, 
and 9.7 percent in the case of other cargo vessels. This means an additional $380 million which could reduce 
borrowing for the Canal’s expansion. 
10 The CFZ as an enclosure began operations in 1953. In its initial steps, businesses located in the CFZ were 
heavily subsidized (in terms of rental fees and cost of public utilities). In addition, firms were exempt from 
custom  duties,  income  taxation  (rates  were  very  low),  property  taxes,  and  municipal  licenses.  In  the 
beginning, there were many problems related to the smuggling of goods from the CFZ into the Panamanian 
economy. See Moreira (1995), Misión Fiscal a Panamá (1964) and World Bank (1995). corporations, and export processing firms. The expansion of activities has been impressive 
(in 2004 there were 1,800 firms operating in the CFZ, compared to nearly 1,000 in 1990). 
These activities are largely tax free and highly complemented by financing provided by the 
FBC.  In  2004,  the  CFZ  generated  8  percent  of  Panama’s  total  GDP,  while  directly 
employing 3 percent of the labor force (21,000 jobs).  
 
The  difference  between  the  value  of  re-exports  and  imports  by  the  CFZ  has  been 
significant, accounting to about a third of Panama’s total exports of goods. Total trade 
volume has been increasing considerably. However, net exports have been decreasing in 
recent years (see Figure 2). In fact, net exports from the CFZ fell to US$350 million on 
average per year in 2002-2003, from around $550 million in 1999-2001.   
 
Financial Banking Center  
 
Much  like  in  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong,  financial  services  have  been  the  Panamanian 
growth industry since the late 1960s. Financial and business services developed as a result 
of deliberate policies that responded to the needs of foreign investors. In these three cases, 
financial centers initially had a regional character, taking advantage of the proximity to 
other countries and providing ease of operation of subsidiaries of foreign banks. In the case 
of  Panama,  dollarization  was  also  a  major  advantage  in  order  to  become  a  financial 
center.
11   
 
In its origins, prudential regulation was nonexistent; banks operated freely, without reserve 
requirements and disciplined only by the market. In 1970 a new banking law created the 
Comisión Bancaria Nacional and imposed a reserve requirement (banks were also required 
to have contingent credit lines from foreign banks
12). Under the new framework, financial 
intermediation experienced a significant expansion during the 1970s.  
 
The debt crisis of the 1980s had devastating effects on the FBC. These problems were 
aggravated by more competition from other centers of “off-shore” banking and, specially, 
by the domestic political crisis. As a result of sanctions imposed by the U.S. government, 
banks were temporary closed in 1988, leading to 50 percent reduction in deposits and loans 
during that year. Although the system recovered during the 1990s, the lessons of the 1980s 
led to the adoption of a new banking law in 1998. A formal superintendency was created, 
Basel  standards of prudential regulation were adopted, and money laundering activities 
were criminalized (IMF, 2001).  
 
Foreign loans and deposits (as a percentage of the total) have been steadily decreasing since 
the late 1970s (Figure 3). Of the foreign component, 85 percent of the loans and 80 percent 
of the deposits correspond to other Latin American countries, suggesting that Panama is a 
regional (more than a global) financial center with a growing domestic market. Finally, 
                                                             
11 According to Johnson (1976), “Panama has welcomed foreign financial enterprises with liberal banking 
laws and a generally laissez-faire attitude and has not (so far) attempted to coerce them into accepting some 
governmentally determined concept of obligations to the state that seriously impede their pursuit of profitable 
business.” However, Johnson was relative pessimistic about the capacity of the financial sector to promote 
broad economic development in Panama.  
12 See Fedesarrollo (1972, p.120). non-performing loans in Panama are among the lowest in the region, interest rates have 
been  traditionally  low,  and  levels  of  liquidity  have  been  adequate  and  stable.  These 
outcomes reflect a combination of factors, such as adequate regulation, competition by 
foreign banks, and low inflation. This high degree of financial depth is, as we will see, one 
of the key strengths of Panama’s economy (Figure 4). Trusts administered by Panamanian 
banks have grown considerably in recent years (from US $ 3 billion in assets in 2001 to 5.5 
billion in 2006), suggesting that the FBC is strong and dynamic. 
 
In sum, Panama has a high degree of financial integration (perfect capital mobility), high 
financial deepening (total financial assets are equal to 300 percent of GDP, while domestic 
credit is close to 90 percent of GDP); and full dollarization. To some extent, these three 






Panama is perhaps the largest country in the world that has used the dollar as its legal 
tender for more than a century (even though it has a national currency, the balboa, which 
circulates as coins and is used as unit of account).
14 In practice, there is no central bank and 




Figure 5 shows annual inflation rates in the U.S. and Panama between 1961 and 2006. 
Interestingly, Panama’s inflation has been lower than in the U.S., which is not an obvious 
consequence of dollarization. Figure 6 depicts the real exchange rate measured in various 
forms (the bilateral rates with the U.S. using the CPI and the WPI, and the multilateral real 
effective exchange rates measured by the IMF) which is at odds with the observed long-run 
real appreciation of developing countries (as pointed by Goldfajn and Olivares, 2001). For 
example, Hong Kong, partially dollarized and also service-based economy, does not show 
such a pattern. One implication of the observed long-run real depreciation is that Panama 
does not conform to the typical pattern of countries abundant in natural resources.  
 
To understand the possible causes of the observed real depreciation in Panama, it is useful 
to write the real exchange rate (RER), using CPI baskets and applying the law of one price 
for traded goods, as 
 
                                                             
13 Under dollarization, the absence of a lender of last resort forces banks to secure foreign funds in order to 
deal  with  liquidity  shortfalls.  This  makes  financial  liberalization  a  necessary  condition  for  successful 
dollarization. Concerns over the fact that monetary policy in Panama is determined by the policies of the main 
banks led in the 1970s to the proposal o creating a national stabilization fund.  See Harberger (1972).  
14 Ecuador and El Salvador are larger, but their experience with dollarization is more recent.  
15 The U.S. dollar was widely used in Panama prior to the independence in part because gold from California 
was shipped through Panama in the 19th Century, and also because Colombia experienced a hyperinflation 
episode during the Thousand Days War (1899-1902) when annual inflation was 100 percent on average. The 
desire for monetary stability, the wide use of the dollar, and the political importance of close integration with 
the  United  States,  explain  Panama’s  de  facto  decision  to  adopt  the  dollar  as  legal  tender.  The  1904 
Constitution (Article 117) says that: “No podrá haber en la República papel moneda de curso forzoso”. 
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where α is the share of nontraded goods and services (NT) in the economy (an * denotes the 
foreign country). A real depreciation can be interpreted as a faster increase in the prices of 
nontraded goods in the US relative to Panama. According to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, 
countries with rapid productivity growth experience increases in the relative prices of NT 
goods (under the assumption that productivity growth lowers the prices of traded goods). 
This is a plausible explanation, because –as we will show- productivity growth has been 
higher in the US than in Panama. It is also possible that productivity growth in Panama has 





Panama suffers from chronic dualism.
16 Salaries paid in the modern services (as well as in 
government  services)  can  be  three  times  higher  than  in  agriculture  and  manufacturing, 
reflecting  differences  in  labor  productivity  (Figure  7  shows  the  widening  gap  in  labor 
productivity between the traditional and modern sectors). Moreover, labor productivities in 
agriculture  and  manufacturing  are  much  lower  in  Panama  than  in  Hong  Kong  and 
Singapore  (Figure  8).  Regional  differences  within  the  country  are  equally  striking.  Per 
capita GDP is much lower in the rural areas, as only 20 percent of GDP is produced outside 
the province of Panama and the CFZ.  
 
In general, modern sectors have been less regulated and more flexible to adjust to market 
conditions. Labor, trade, and tax policies imply greater ‘economic freedom’ in the modern 
services,  relative  to  the  more  backward  sectors.  For  example,  the  agricultural  sector  is 
heavily protected (through tariffs and quotas) and regulated (minimum wages, reference 
prices,  etc.).  Policies  were  oriented  towards  achieving  self-sufficiency,  rather  than 
competitiveness. Something similar occurred in the manufacturing sector, where effective 
tariffs are often over 100 percent (See World Bank, 1995 and MEF, 1999). 
 
Labor  regulation  is  one  example  of  policy-induced  dualism.  The  1971  labor  code 
established a complex system of sector-specific minimum wages, raised costs of dismissal, 
restricted temporary labor contracts, and gave the government ample capacity to intervene 
in  labor  relations  (World  Bank,  1995  and  2000).  Output  growth  in  manufacturing  and 
agriculture has been sluggish, while employment in these sectors has grown at an even 
                                                             
16 This concept refers to various asymmetries in production and organization. The term was coined by Boeke 
(1953) to represent a society divided between the traditional and modern (capitalist) sectors. The asymmetries 
can relate to the existence of fixed factors of production that cannot move between sectors, or to the absence 
of profit maximization in one of the sectors (as in Lewis’ model), or to rigidities in the labor market (as in 
Harris-Todaro). Dualism can also refer to asymmetries in the stage of development between two regions (as in 
the North-South models). slower  pace.
17  Modern  sectors,  such  as  the  Canal  and  the  CFZ  have  separate  labor 




By any measure, Panama has one of the highest levels of inequality in Latin America. 
Poverty rates, in contrast, are relatively low at least when measured by the two dollars 
(PPP) per day poverty line (See Figure 9).
18 However, poverty rates are unusually high 
relative  to  other  countries  with  similar  incomes.  In  other  words,  countries  with  lower 
availability  of  resources,  but  with  less  inequality,  tend  to  have  less  poverty.  Also,  the 
differences in poverty and extreme poverty between the city of Panama and the rest of 
country are considerable: 20 percent vs. 63 percent in the case of poverty and 4.4 percent 
vs. 35 percent in the case of extreme poverty. Poverty is very high among the indigenous 
population.   
 
Given its high inequality, Panama is paradigmatic example of the limitations of poverty-
reducing strategies based solely on growth. Accelerating growth alone does not result in a 
rapid poverty reduction, whereas a combination of faster growth and lower inequality can 
provide a large dividend in terms of poverty. 
 
 
3.  Panama’s GDP growth  
 
Before we embark on Panama’s growth diagnosis, it is useful to take a look at growth 
performance using three standard analytical devices. We start by discussing the insights 
provided by cross-country growth regressions. We then analyze the time series evidence in 
order to identify structural breaks in Panama’s recent growth. We finish this section by 





Following  Glaeser  et  al.  (2004),  Table  2  shows  a  standard  OLS  regression  where  the 
dependent  variable  is  the  growth  of  per  capita  income  between  1960  and  2000.  The 
independent variables are initial income per capita in 1960, initial level of schooling, the 
share of the population living in temperate zones, as well as a measure of institutional 
quality such as constraints on the executive, autocracy, and risk of expropriation (averaged 
over the same period). The regressions include a dummy variable for Colombia, Ecuador, 
Panama and Venezuela, which at one point in history were part of the same country. The 
precise definitions and sources of the variables are available from Glaeser et al. (2004). 
                                                             
17 Estimated output elasticities are 0.1 for employment in primary sectors, and 0.5 for manufacturing, while in 
retail, real state, social services elasticities are close to 2. Interestingly, elasticities in finance and transport are 
0.7. See Galiani (2006). 
18 According to Paes de Barros et al. (2003) the poorest deciles are poorer while the rich are richer in Panama, 
in comparison with the Andean countries (with the exception of Colombia). Also, in Panama average income 
is 2.5 times the poverty line, in contrast with Honduras and Nicaragua (where average income is equal to the 
poverty line). This means that is easier for Panama to reduce poverty.  The results confirm the existence of convergence, the adverse effects of tropical conditions, 
the positive influence of the initial level of education, and the positive correlation between 
growth and the average assessments of institutional quality. The dummy for Panama is the 
only  significant  country  dummy.  Moreover,  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  on  the  dummy 
variable is positive, indicating that per capita income in Panama growths an additional 0.9 
percentage points per year due to other factors that are not captured in this simple empirical 
model. 
 
It is well known that human capital and average institutional quality can improve as a result 
of the growth process itself, so that causality runs in reverse. We deal with this issue by 
using instrumental variables. The choice of instruments follows the now conventional use 
of  settler  mortality  and  indigenous  population  density  in  1500,  first  introduced  by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002).
19 Arguably, these variables are good 
instruments for modern day institutions because when mortality rates where high or when a 
region was already densely urbanized by the locals, the Europeans introduced exploitative 
institutions, rather than settling themselves. Two other instruments are French legal origin, 
which La Porta et al. (1999) find to be associated with less constrained executives, and the 
share of population living in temperate climates, a measure of geographical conditions, 
which Sachs (2001 and 2003) has found to be negatively associated with development. 
 
Table  3  presents  the  results  of  the  instrumental  variables  estimation  of  the  effects  of 
average years of schooling between 1960 and 2000 and average institutional quality on log 
GDP per capita in 2000. The regressions also include the dummy variables for the countries 
of interest. Panel A presents the second stage results and shows that, once variables have 
been adequately instrumented, educational attainment is the only variable that matters as a 
determinant of per capita income. None of the dummy variables come out significant in this 
stage.  
 
Panel B is perhaps more insightful from the viewpoint of this paper because it indicates that 
the choice of instruments explain well both institutions and years of schooling. That is, 
colonial times variables, such as settler mortality, density of indigenous population, and 
legal origin, as well as geographically-driven variables (such as the presence of tropical 
conditions)  are  good  predictors  of  today’s  levels  of  schooling  and  institutional  quality. 
Interestingly, Panama’s institutions are not better than what would be predicted by the 
model, contrary to what could be expected given the strong U.S. engagement since 1903.
20 
In contrast, in the case of education the country dummy comes out significant. This means 
that, for reasons not accounted by the model, the population has on average three more 
years of schooling. Although we will postpone the discussion as to why Panama has been 
                                                             
19 According to their figures, indigenous population density in 1500 was higher in Panama than in Colombia 
and Venezuela, but lower than in Ecuador. Settler mortality was two times higher in Panama relative to the 
other three countries. Based in Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002), this evidence alone would predict lower 
quality institutions and long term growth in Panama, relative to the other members of la Gran Colombia.  
20 This is an interesting result because it suggests that the  U.S. presence  in the isthmus did not improve 
institutional quality. The current institutions are in line with those that correspond to the legacy of the Spanish 
colonization. more successful in terms of educational attainment, this is likely the Canal’s most tangible 




Time series evidence  
 
Unfortunately, GDP data for Panama are only available since 1950.
22 In addition to the 
scarcity of data, the treatment of the services provided in the Canal Zone has been a source 
of major changes, such as the 1982 revision (with data starting in 1980) when the transport, 
storage  and  communication  services  provided  by  the  Canal  were  incorporated  into  the 
national accounts, following the 1977 treaties with the U.S. As a result of this revision, 




As shown in Figure 10, economic growth in Panama has been generally higher than the 
average for Latin America. Average annual growth was over 8 percent during the 1960s, 
but subsequently decelerated until reaching very low rates (negative in per capita terms) in 
the 1980s. Since the 1990s, Panama has again outperformed the region. At the same time, 
GDP  growth  volatility  has  been  relatively  average,  at  least  compared  to  other  Latin 
American countries.  
 
It is also useful to identify structural breaks in economic growth. We follow closely the 
empirical strategy of Berg et al. (2006) and apply the two-step procedure proposed by Bai 
and Perron (1998 and 2003) aimed at testing for multiple structural breaks in a single time 
series,  when  both  the  total  number  and  the  potential  location  of  those  breaks  are 
unknown.
24  Figure  11  presents  the  results  of  the  estimation  that  find  evidence  of  a 
downbreak in GDP growth in 1981, followed by an upbreak in 1989.
25  
 
The 1980s were a particularly bad decade for Panama’s economy. The debt crisis resulted 
in a severe contraction in deposits in the FBC (which fell 25 percent between 1982 and 
                                                             
21  Higher  education  is  likely  to  be  a  consequence  of  the  significant  flows  of  immigration  and  the  U.S. 
influence in the educational system from the 1920s onwards.  
22 The source is Contraloría General de la República which is also responsible of producing much of the 
country’s economic information. 
23 A new base was adopted in 1996, when additional methodological changes were introduced. 
24 In the first step, the procedure identifies all possible breaks and estimates their statistical significance using 
F tests. If there is evidence of at least one structural break, the procedure then selects the optimal number of 
breaks. In empirical work, an important issue is concerned with the selection of the minimum number of years 
between breaks. This decision involves a trade-off because choosing a large number of years means that the 
procedure can miss some true breaks. But, on the other hand, a small number of years lowers the power of the 
test. 
25 We chose a minimum number of years equal to h=8, that represents a 15 percent of the total sample (55 
observations). In order to test robustness of our results, we used lower values of h and included a dummy 
variable for 1980 (to capture the inclusion of Canal Zone in national accounts). The result of a downbreak in 
1981 remains unchanged. 1984).
26 More importantly, by the end of the decade (when most of the region was already 




In 1987, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions in an effort to remove General Noriega 
(commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces) from power. Panamanian assets in the 
United States were frozen, canal payments to the Panamanian government were suspended, 
the  U.S.  revoked  Panama's  most  favored  trade  status  and  banned  all  payments  from 
American individuals and companies. The result was a 13.4 percent GDP contraction in 
1988.
28 After the return to democracy in late 1989, growth rates rebounded to an average 






To gain further insight into Panama’s growth performance, this section presents the result 
of a standard sources-of-growth decomposition. The methodology (which is described in 
Appendix  1)  considers  three  factors  of  production  (labor,  physical  capital,  and  human 
capital). GDP data come from World Development Indicators (WDI) for the 1960-2005 
period, while the capital stock was constructed applying the perpetual inventory method to 
capital formation data (net of depreciation) reported by CEPAL (1960-1980) and WDI 
(1980-2005). Employment series were obtained from Contraloría General de la República 
for the period 1963-2005. We follow Calderón et al. (2002) and construct a human capital 
index by adding the share of the population with different levels of schooling (primary, 
secondary and tertiary), obtained from Barro and Lee (2000), weighted by their respective 
rates of return, obtained from Psacharopoulos (1994).  
 
Table  4  shows  the  results  from  the  decomposition.  Half  of  the  average  GDP  growth 
between 1964 and 2005 (4.1 percent) can be “explained” as a result of physical capital 
accumulation, while the other half roughly corresponds to increases in employment. The 
decomposition also shows that total factor productivity has been a negative force in the 
growth process.  
 
The information per decades provides additional elements useful for the analysis. Growth 
during the 1960s was driven mostly by investment in physical capital and increases in 
                                                             
26 According to Caballero (1988) the introduction of International Banking Facilities (IBF) in 1981 allowed 
U.S. banks to conduct offshore operations directly. Between 1982 and 1984 Bank of America and Citibank 
reduced their assets in Panama by 93 percent and 63 percent, respectively. 
27  Political  problems  started  in  late  1985  with  the  murder  of  Hugo  Spadafora  (who  planned  to  expose 
Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and arms smuggling) and the subsequent resignation of President 
Nicolás  Ardito  Barletta.  According  to  Gilboa  (1995),  a  turning  point  occurred  in  February  1988,  when 
Noriega was indicted in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering. 
28 The end of the Noriega regime came after a large scale military intervention in December 1989. Noriega 
was finally extradited to the U.S. on January 3, 1990. 
29 Estimates from Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990) indicate that the actual cost of sanctions was close to 6 
percent  of  Panama’s  GDP.  The  general  conclusion  is  that  sanctions  to  Panama  (although  costly)  were 
relatively ineffective in terms of achieving their policy goal (see Davis and Engerman, 2003). productivity. During the 1970s, economic growth decelerated, in spite significant progress 
in human capital, mostly because of the reversal in TFP. The 1980s, the lost decade for 
Panama’s growth, can be explained by low investment in physical capital, coupled with a 
further reduction in productivity. The recovery since the early 1990s has been, to a large 
extent,  the  result  of  modest  increases  in  human  and  physical  capital,  combined  with  a 
positive contribution of TFP. 
 
Figure 12 summarizes the main lessons of this exercise. In the long-run, Panama’s growth 
strategy has been driven by physical capital accumulation, while human capital has played 
a moderate role. The most revealing feature is, however, the negative role of total factor 
productivity. There is no doubt that the gap in growth between Panama, on the one hand, 
and Hong Kong, on the other, is explained by TFP.
30  
 
We calculated TFP for manufacturing sectors between 1963 and 2000, using 3-digit annual 
industrial sector data from UNIDO (INDSTAT). The results (not reported) suggest that the 
observed negative TFP growth is generalized across manufacturing sectors, with the only 





4.  Growth Diagnostics: General aspects 
 
We now turn to the application of the growth diagnostics methodology (GDM). The overall 
idea of the GDM is to identify whether low growth is the result of low returns or high cost 
of finance. In turn, low returns can arise from problems of appropriability or from low 
returns to factor accumulation. Disentangling whether ‘the most binding constraint’ to grow 
is related to low returns, problems of private appropriability, or inadequate financing is 
more art than science especially when data are scarce. However, we will try to present 
some  evidence  in  an  organized  and  systematic  way,  which  allows  us  to  reach  some 
conclusions.  
 
Low  private  returns,  in  turn,  can  be  the  result  of  various  forces,  such  as  inadequate 
availability  of  factors  of  production  (physical  and  human  capital)  and  technology. 
Geographical  barriers  can  also  be  an  impediment  to  adequate  returns.  Appropriability 
problems can arise from different sources, such as high and unstable rates of effective 
taxation. Macroeconomic instability, leading to uncertainty in terms of inflation, exchange 
and interest rates, as well as in policy variables, can exacerbate this type of problems. But, 
ultimately, weak institutions are the main source of problems of appropriability. Inadequate 
enforcement of property rights and the rule of law, high levels of crime and corruption 
reduce private returns. Lastly, low returns can also arise from the private sector’s inability 
to  identify  or  find  attractive  business  opportunities.  In  Hausmann  and  Rodrik’s  (2005) 
terminology, this is the problem of ‘self-discovery’.   
 
                                                             
30 In this sense, the experience of Panama is closer to that of Singapore where the government has pursued a 
development strategy based on the accumulation of physical capital.  See Young (1992).  
31 These results are available from the authors. Inadequate financing can also have diverse origins. Lack of access to external financing is a 
frequent problem, often associated with high country risk premia (interest rate spreads) or 
low FDI. As discussed by Hausmann et al. (2004), these problems can be caused by many 
factors, such as regulations affecting foreign capital, existing levels of external debt, and 
macroeconomic  conditions.  However,  the  most  recent  research  on  the  determinants  of 
capital  flows  (specifically  FDI)  points  again  in  the  direction  of  institutions  (see,  for 
example, Alfaro et al. 2005). Problems related to the development of domestic financial 
markets  are  equally  important.  In  this  case,  financial  repression,  inadequate  prudential 
regulation, and weak enforcement of creditor rights can be the more fundamental causes. 
Low savings can also be a factor resulting in high financial costs.  
 
Our plan is to follow each one of the branches of the tree shown in Diagram 1. Using 
evidence for multiple sources (including recent surveys) we will conclude that the problems 
of appropriation are central to the story in the case of Panama. Within this category, we 
consider that the regulatory framework, especially in the traditional sectors, is the main 
force that prevents faster output growth. Labor market regulation is an excellent example, 
but is not the only one. Protectionism, high levels of corruption, and strong and influential 
interest  groups,  create  an  entrenched  status  quo  that  is  functional  to  various  groups, 
including the modern service sectors.  
 
Self-discovery  is  another  interesting  dimension  in  this  case.  From  an  early  success  in 
identifying three key sectors (the Canal, CFZ and FBC), finding new opportunities has 
become  more  difficult.  Many  options,  ranging  from  telecommunications  to  tourism  are 
often mentioned, but, as we will discuss, we favor a strategy which focuses on lifting some 
general and horizontal constraints that impede a more balanced growth path.   
 





























Low levels of private investment and entrepreneurship
Low returns to economic activity
Market failure
Low appropiability
High cost of finance





Prior to analyzing each one of the branches of the GDM tree, we take advantage of the 
information contained in the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES)  which periodically 
collect  information  from  formal  firms  (more  than  5  employees)  in  the  manufacturing, 
services,  transport,  warehousing,  and  communications  sectors.  Although  the  sample 
probably over-represents firms in the modern sector, the information is nonetheless relevant 
because it allows us to identify what firms’ consider are the most severe problems for 
growth.
32 The survey includes information about the firms’ size, sector of operation, and 
experience.  
 
Among the possible obstacles to the firms’ operations the survey includes access to credit, 
infrastructure  (power  and  telecommunications),  labor  market  (quality  of  labor  and 
regulation), relations between government and business (i.e., corruption), competition from 
informal firms, and other factors (taxation, crime, transport, etc.).   
 
To simplify the analysis we group responses for which firms consider that a problem is a 
minimum  obstacle  (adding  responses  “no  obstacle”,  “minor  obstacle”  and  “moderate 
obstacle”  in  the  survey’s  terminology)  and  severe  obstacle  (“major  obstacle”  o  “very 
severe obstacle” in the survey’s code). 
 
Comparing firms’ perceptions in Panama with those in other Latin American countries 
(Argentina,  Bolivia,  Colombia,  México,  Peru,  Paraguay,  and  Uruguay)  shows  some 
interesting differences. In general, apart from specific problems in Panama related to power 
infrastructure, all other problems seem to be less severe than in the rest of the region (Table 
5). Panama’s firms (or at least those surveyed) have a more favorable situation in areas 
such as informality, corruption, telecommunications infrastructure, access to credit, quality 
of the labor force, and labor regulation. 
 
                                                             
32 For a complete description of the methodological aspects of the survey see World Bank (2007). To provide a more precise assessment we estimated a probit model, which allows us to 
control for other characteristics of the firm, where the dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes a zero value if the firm considers the specific factor is a minimum obstacle and one 
when it is regarded as a severe obstacle. Control variables include economic sector, size 
(small, medium, or large), whether the firm is an exporter, age, experience of the manager 
(in years), and the equity share of the largest shareholder. We add a dummy variable for 
firms  in  Panama.  The  estimated  marginal  effects  indicate  that  Panama’s  business 
environment is of better quality than in the rest of the region (see Table 6).  
 
 
5.  Growth Diagnostics: Low social returns?  
 
According to the GDM ( Diagram 1), we will discuss three  aspects that  can explain low  social returns: (i) poor 
geography; (ii.) low human capital, and (iii.) bad infrastructure. The latter two issues are 
clearly intertwined with the capacity of government and, in the case of infrastructure, with 
access to long term financing, suggesting that the separation of themes is, to a large extent, 
a matter of choice.  
 
  Geography  
 
The relationship between geographical conditions and development is the subject of an 
extensive literature. For example, Jeffrey Sachs and coauthors (Gallup et al., 1998 and 
Sachs, 2001 and 2003) have underscored the adverse consequences of tropical conditions, 
with special attention to the effects on health. Contrary to the predictions of these models, 
Panama’s  geographical  location  is  its  greatest  comparative  advantage.  Interestingly, 
development in Panama came along with scientific advances in the prevention of tropical 
diseases, showing that geography is not destiny.
33  
 
  Human Capital  
 
As we already mentioned, Panama does not seem to be constrained in terms of human 
capital. Aggregate indicators, such as enrollment rates, tend to be higher than in the rest of 
Latin America. This is particularly the case in primary and tertiary education (Figure 13). 
Progress in education has been outstanding since 1991. For example, universal enrollment 
in primary has been accomplished, while enrollment in tertiary doubled to 43 percent. The 
increase in years of schooling has been equally impressive: from 4.6 years in 1960 to 8.3 in 
2000 (Figure 14), in spite of its relatively high initial value. Also, high returns to education 
should be observed if human capital is relatively scarce. But, as shown in Table 7, this does 
not seem to be the case.
34 Quality of education has been mentioned as a potential constraint. 
Unfortunately,  only  recently  Panama  participated  in  an  international  standardized  test 
sponsored by UNESCO that  will allow comparisons in terms of education quality (the 
results will be available in 2008).  
 
Indirect evidence on school quality based on the returns to education of immigrants in the 
U.S.  labor  market  shows  that  Panama  is  not  in  a  unfavorable  situation,  at  least  when 
compared to other Latin American countries. For example, Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) 
estimate that the return to education of Panamanian immigrants in the U.S. (i.e. the value 
that the U.S. labor market places on a year of schooling from Panama) is 3.6 percent (using 
                                                             
33 This fascinating history is well documented in the classic work of David McCullough (1977) and in the 
more recent work of Parker (2006). 
34 According to Céspedes (1985), Panama’s educational system was in ruins after Colombia’s civil war of the 
“Thousand Days” (1899-1902). As all schools had been closed during the war, education became a priority 
after independence in 1903. Law 11 of 1904, one of the first laws of new republic, established the framework 
for mandatory and free primary education in the isthmus. In addition, the construction of the Canal between 
1904  and  1914  had  positive  spillovers  on  education  (one  case  in  point  is  the  immigration  of  medical 
personnel). Also, the government promoted the immigration of teachers from Germany, Switzerland, and the 
United States, while a group of Panamanians was sent overseas to receive education. By 1908 there were 
already 222 schools, while between 1920 and 1934 enrollment rates in primary  education were doubled. 
Illiteracy rates fell from 70 percent in 1923, to 50 percent in 1930, 28 percent in 1950, and 20 percent in the 
1960s. the 1990 U.S. Census). This figure is higher for Panama than for any other Latin American 
country in the sample, with the exception of Argentina (5.1 percent), Brazil (4.1 percent), 
Costa Rica (3.8 percent), Chile (4.4 percent), and Uruguay (4.6 percent). The corresponding 
figure  for  Singapore  is  6.2  percent.
35  On  this  account,  Panama’s  schooling  quality  is 
intermediate in the regional context, but inferior than the one observed among its more 
natural peers, such as Singapore.   
 
According  to  Hendricks  (2002),  the  463  Panamanian  immigrants  (in  the  database  of 
106,263  immigrants  between  the  ages  of  20  and  69),  had  on  average  13.3  years  of 
schooling  (compared  to  7.2  for  the  population  in  Panama
36).  Panamanian  immigrant’s 
earnings were 90.6 percent of those of a native-born worker with identical age, education, 
and sex. This figure, again, is well above that of other Latin American countries in the 
sample, with the exception of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The conclusion is that in 
terms  of  education  quality,  Panama  seems  to  be  in  a  better  position  than  most  other 
countries in the region. 
 
Hendricks (2002) uses this result to investigate the role of educational quality differences in 
explaining  differences  in  per-capita  income  across  countries.  Decomposing  earnings 
differences  between  the  U.S.  and  Panama  into  contributions  of  physical  capital  and 
measured and unmeasured skills, he finds that mean earnings per worker in Panama are 
0.22 of the U.S. level. The lower Panamanian capital-output ratio accounts for a reduction 
of earnings in Panama to 0.93 of the U.S. level. Lower measured skills reduce further 
earnings in Panama to 0.71 (based on human capital stocks and returns to education in 
Panama), while lower unmeasured skills bring them to 0.66 (based on what Panamanian 
immigrants  earn  in  the  U.S.).  This  means  that  there  is  a  3.1  factor  to  be  explained 
(0.66/0.22) which is attributable to differences in productivity. The unexplained part is 
large for Panama, relative to the large majority of 67 countries in the sample, reinforcing 
our view that Panama has serious productivity problems.
37  
 
In a recent study, Galiani (2006) also finds that TFP has performed poorly during the last 
25 years in Panama. Using household surveys, he computes hourly real wages per unit of 
human capital and finds a declining trend. Average wages did increase, but mostly as a 
result of the considerable increase in human capital and not because workers became more 
productive given their human capital. In other words, workers with the same human capital 
did not experience, on average, an increase in real wages. In the medium term, if output 
grows  faster  than  predicted  in  some  sectors  that  are  skill  intensive,  or  this  intensity 
increases over time beyond what is expected, human capital will emerge as a constraint. 
However, this is not likely to occur soon.  
 
                                                             
35 They also find that differences in rates of return in 1990 are related to differences in schools characteristics 
in 1970 (when immigrants undertook their education). Measures of school quality include pupil-teacher ratios 
in primary schools, relative expenditures per pupil (expenditures per student divided by per capita GDP), and 
years of compulsory education.  
36 According to Barro and Lee (2000). 
37  For  example,  the  unexplained  factor  is  1.0  for  Mexico,  2.1  for  Argentina,  1.9  for  Brazil,  and  1.8  for 
Colombia. The average for the full sample is 2.2.  From a different angle, Paes de Barros et al. (2002, p. 276) reach a similar conclusion and 
argue that what explains lower incomes in Panama relative to OECD and certain Latin 
American  countries  are  differences  in  job  quality.  The  same  is  true  in  the  case  in  the 
explanation of poor vs. non-poor incomes in Panama. Even though there are differences in 
schooling (between poor and non poor), differences in job quality explain up to 50 percent 
of lower incomes among the poorer deciles in Panama. This piece of evidence suggests that 
Panama is not constrained by human capital. It is constrained by the availability of high 
quality jobs. The slow progress, and in some phases reversals, in productivity is consistent 
with this view. 
 
Even if the quantity and quality of education do not seem to be Panama’s main constraint, 
two  caveats  are  in  place.  First,  tertiary  education  in  Panama  is  concentrated  in  some 
disciplines, such as law, that have been important for the development of the FBC and other 
services. However, the technological parks and export processing zones require a different 
type of training. Second, education inequalities (both regionally and at the individual level) 
are a problem. All human capital measures are substantially lower in the rural areas, and 
especially among the indigenous and poor. To give a sense, illiteracy rates for adult women 
in the bottom quintile were 29 percent in 1997, while average schooling was 4.2 years in 
this group, compared to 11.3 years in the top quintile (see Table 8). Differences are even 
greater  between  provinces.  For  example,  in  the  city  of  Panama  illiteracy  rates  are  2.7 
percent and the population has close to 10 years of schooling (9.8 for men and 10.2 for 
women). In contrast, in the province of Darien (the poorest) illiteracy is very high (44 
percent),  while  the  educational  attainment  is  minimal  (3.3  years  for  men  and  2.3  for 
women). These differences reinforce the dual structure of the economy and indicate that 
although education may not be a restriction in the modern sector, it is one of the factors that 
prevent the development of the more backward sectors. In fact, low education is what keeps 




  Infrastructure  
 
Physical measures, as well as perception-based surveys, suggest that infrastructure is not a 
major problem in Panama. According to World Bank data, 35 percent of the roads are 
paved, well above figures for other countries such as Chile and Mexico. However, Panama 
is  lagging  in  terms  of  the  information  and  communications  technologies.  Coverage  in 
telephones lines (fixed and mobile), computers, and broadband internet access are, in all 
cases, below the regional average. In turn, ICS data show some level of inefficiency in the 
case  of  electricity  utilities.  Power  outages  seem  to  be  relatively  high.  Some  analysts 
consider that power outages are expected until 2010 because generating capacity will be 
insufficient given the current growth in demand.
39 In 2010 a new 223 MW hydro power 
plant is expected to be completed (lack of past investment in the sector reflects regulatory 
problems). Interestingly, outages affect mostly the residential and traditional sectors, as the 
modern activities (PCA and Banks) self-generate their own power needs.   
 
                                                             
38 Employees in the FBC must have a second language, and a graduate degree in the case of the PCA.  
39 See Chapman (2007). Interviews conducted in Panama suggest that problems are related to high costs. A case in 
point  is  electricity  and  land  transport  costs  in  the  country.  In  a  recent  survey  of 
approximately  200  firms  for  the  Foro  Nacional  para  la  Competitividad,  respondents 
considered the high cost of electricity as the main obstacle for production across all firms’ 
sizes (labor costs were the second main obstacle). 
 
Finally, indicators from the Global Competitiveness Report suggest that Panama has better 
infrastructure that most countries in Latin America, but worse than in Singapore and Hong 
Kong.  According  to  the  World  Business  Environment  Survey  (from  the  World  Bank), 
Panama is one of the few countries where respondents considered that infrastructure is not a 
problem for business development. Fewer than 15 percent of the respondents considered 
that it is an obstacle.  
 
 
6.  Growth Diagnostics: Appropriability Issues  
 
Investment is discouraged when social and private rates of return differ considerably. This 
occurs when there are problems of appropriability. According to Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2005),  these  problems  can  emerge  from  various  sources:  i)  high  rates  of  taxation;  ii) 
macroeconomic unbalances which create uncertainty over key variables; iii) poor definition 
and protection of property rights (leading to crime, corruption and judicial manipulation), 
and iv) uncertainty associated with political instability and changes in the rules of the game. 
 
 
  Issues related to the tax structure 
 
Tax revenues in Panama are close to 9 percent of GDP (2003), one of the lowest levels in 
Latin America (see Table 9).
40 This is the result of narrow tax bases and low tax rates of the 
VAT (known as ITBMS), in addition to the large number of exceptions and exemptions in 
income taxation. Chronic tax evasion problems also result in very low tax productivities 
(IMF,  2006).  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  VAT,  the  general  rate  is  5  percent  and 
revenues are only 0.9 percent of GDP.  
 
Regarding income taxation, the highest marginal tax rate is 30 percent, in line with the 
regional’s  average  (in  1998  it  was  only  15  percent).  However,  many  exemptions  and 
special treatments remain in place. For example, profits from the FBC were exempt until 
2002, while in the case of the CFZ the applicable tax rate is much lower. Although tax 
reform has been a focal point of the economic policy debate in Panama, progress has been 
limited. The reason is that with the current levels of taxation, plus revenues from the Canal, 
the government is able to pay for its expenses.  
 
                                                             
40 There were some tax initiatives during the 1990s. In June 1995, a reform lowered the maximum corporate 
income tax from 34 percent to 30 percent; increased the income tax for exporters in the Colon Free Zone from 
2.5–8.5 percent to 15 percent,  and generalized a tax credit of up to 25 percent of investment. In September 
1996, however, the income tax for exporters in the Colon Free Zone was eliminated. The  2002  tax  reform  broadened  the  ITBMS  to  services  but  reduced  personal  income 
taxation.
41 The 2005 tax reform further reduced income tax rates for individuals (from 30 
percent to 27 percent) and introduced a minimum tax on income (6 percent of gross income 




This discussion suggests that, from the point of view of appropriation, taxation is not major 
concern  in  Panama.  In  fact,  according  to  the  Investment  Climate  Survey,  respondents 
consider  that  corporate  income  taxation  is  relatively  low  (both  in  comparison  to  Latin 
American and OECD countries). In spite of this, the number of payments and the time it 
takes to file taxes do not compare favorably (Table10). 
 
 
  Issues related to macroeconomic instability   
 
As we discussed in the previous sections, Panama’s track record in terms of inflation is 
impressive. There are, however, other features of its macroeconomic performance that are 
less favorable. Figure 15 suggests that dollarization has brought low inflation and greater 
financial  depth,  but  not  low  fiscal  deficits  (Edwards,  2001  and  Goldfanj  and  Olivares, 
2001). Public and external debt (both as percent of GDP) is larger in Panama than in the 
region as a whole (Figure 16).  
 
Even in the absence of currency risk, Panama’s default risk is not negligible. According to 
Standard and Poor’s rating structure, as in Costa Rica and Guatemala, Panama’s external 
debt has a BB rating (July 2007) below the investment grade of Singapore (AAA), Hong 
Kong (AA), Chile (A), Mexico (BBB), Brazil (BB+), Colombia (BB+), El Salvador (BB+), 
and Peru (BB+). On this account Panama looks like an average Latin American country. 
 
In terms of actual spreads on sovereign bonds, default risk is higher than in Chile and 
Mexico,  but  lower  than  in  Colombia  and  Peru  (Figure  17).  This  suggests  that  rating 
agencies are more worried about Panama’s debt sustainability than markets themselves. In 
any case, the fiscal conditions are not optimal, and markets consider that there is a non 
negligible default risk. History does not help: Suspension of external debt payments 1987-
88 and frequent debt-restructuring have affected its creditworthiness.  
 
                                                             
41  The  reform  raised  the  personal  income  tax  exemption  from  US$3,900  to  US$10,400.  Banks’  income, 
previously largely exempt, became subject to a minimum tax. The annual business registration fee was raised 
from $150 to $250. The corporate income tax rate was scheduled to be lowered from 30 percent to 29 percent 
in 2005, and 28 percent starting in 2007. The ITBM (renamed ITBMS) base was widened to include services, 
albeit with many exceptions (health, education, transportation, electric power, fixed telephone, press, mail, 
insurance, and various other services). Small businesses are exempted (annual sales less than $36,000).The 5-
percent consumption tax levied on a selective basis was extended to include luxury goods.  
42 Other measures included an increase in fees paid by businesses in the CFZ, the cancellation of the 2004 
Industrial  Development  and  Incentive  Act  (Ley  11  de  2004)  and  the  elimination  of  reforestation  and 
nontraditional export tax incentives. ITBMS rate on tobacco were raised to 15 percent. 
 However, macroeconomic instability does not seem to be a major growth constraint. In 
spite  of  fiscal  deficits,  domestic  interest  rates  are  low.  This  is  mostly  the  result  of 
dollarization, free capital mobility and a deep financial system.  
 
 
  Problems of corruption and property rights 
 
To asses this issue we use the international comparisons for 208 countries in 2005, obtained 
from Kaufmann et al. (2006)
43. For each variable, the information is presented both in terms 
of the average value and the confidence interval (vertical lines). Higher values represent 
higher  quality  institutions.  In  general,  Panama  has  an  intermediate  position  in  most 
institutional measures.   
 
Corruption is one of Panama’s most serious institutional problems. Figure 18 indicates that 
Panama is perceived as being more corrupt than other emerging market economies. Other 
sources, including the Heritage Foundation and Transparency International, confirm this 
assessment and suggest an increase in corruption in the earlier part of the present decade 
(see Figure 19). The influence of special interests on regulations, decrees, and laws seems 
to be greater than in the average Latin American country. These conclusions are consistent 
with the Doing Business Report where the share of revenues used to “get things done” is 
greater in Panama than in the region. Similarly, data from the Global Competitiveness 
Report  also  suggests  problems  in  the  area  of  firms’  influence  in  regulatory  and  tax 
decisions.  
 
Interestingly, the most prevalent type of corruption in Panama seems to be political, more 
than bureaucratic. People distrust politicians and consider the diversion of public funds as 
common practice.  
 
Concerns are more related to capture of the State, than with problems of appropriability 
resulting from criminality. In fact, in the area of property rights Panama has a relatively 
comfortable position. As expected in the context of a dual economic structure, institutions 
work better in some sectors, such as the financial system. In this case, the standards are 
closer to those of the OECD countries than to other emerging economies. This is the case, 
for example, of measures such as creditors’ rights and the coverage and information quality 
of credit bureaus. In other economic areas the quality of the regulation is lower. This is the 
case of judicial procedures to enforce contracts (See the Doing Business Report from the 
World Bank, 2006). 
 
 
  Policy instability  
 
Policy  instability  does  not  seem  to  be  an  issue  in  Panama,  at  least  judging  from  the 
perception expressed in business climate surveys. In fact, in other countries of the region, 
such as Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, nearly 90 percent of the respondents consider that 
instability in the rules of the game are either a moderate or a serious obstacle for business 
                                                             
43 Based on opinions surveys to various individuals (businessmen, experts, and government officials). development. Panama has one of the lowest measures of policy instability of the region 
(comparable to Costa Rica and Chile).  
 
To summarize this section, macro risks not a major problem, despite the large fiscal deficit 
and external debt. Default risks are low (comparable to countries with a more solid fiscal 
situation), possibly as a result of the key role of the FBC for the economy. A default is 
unlikely because markets and politicians know that it would devastating for the FBC and, 
hence, for the Panamanian economy. Low default risk implies low interest rates, in spite of 
a weak fiscal situation. Low inflation, primarily a result of dollarization, has also been a 
major advantage, at least relative to other countries in the region.  
 
 
7.  Growth Diagnostics: Too few ideas?  
 
In this section we make extensive use of Hausmann and Klinger (2006) and Klinger and 
Hausmann  (2007).  In  particular,  we  use  their  measure  of  sophistication  of  a  country’s 
export basket (more specifically their variable EXPY which represents the income level 
associated with a country’s export goods basket)). Panama’s export sophistication is similar 
to that of countries with a much lower per capita income, such as Ecuador and Senegal (See 
Figure 20).  
 
Panama’s export goods base is very narrow. There are few exports, apart from the modern 
services (the other exports are mainly fishing and bananas). To show that very few ideas 
have been appeared in recent years it is illustrative to look at the number of goods exported 
(using a 3 digit classification). Out of 240 potential different types of goods, an average 
developed country exports 232, while Latin American countries export 210 (Figure 21). 
Panama  not  only  has  a  low  number  (70),  but  also  very  limited  changes  over  time  (in 
contrast to El Salvador which faces a similar problem
44). The trend in Panama goes in the 
opposite direction (concentration rather than diversification). 
 
Also,  Panama’s  production  structure  is  very  concentrated  in  a  few  goods.  In  terms  of 
Hausmann  and  Klinger’s  representation  of  the  product  space,  a  good  proportion  of 
Panama’s production is in the periphery in the sense of having weak links with the other 
sectors (animal products, fish and crustaceans, garments, jewelry). The implications are of 
interest because when a country is not in the dense part of the production space (what they 
call  “forest”)  productive  transformation  is  more  difficult  because  it  is  harder  to  adapt 
capacities to produce something that is entirely different. However, throughout the years 
there has been a timid move to the center of the forest, though the production of machinery 
and pharmaceuticals (See Appendix 2). 
. 
The open forest size measures how attractive it is to move to other nearby products (a 
combination of distance and sophistication). Figure 22 shows the open forest size which 
has been growing since the 1990s, suggesting a better position than other Central American 
countries.  
 
                                                             
44 See Benavente (2005). Productive transformation implies a tradeoff between choosing products that are relative 
close but with a lower contribution to the “open forest” and goods that are of strategic value  
(because they expand the open forest size) but that are very far and costly to reach. This 
tradeoff is captured in Figure 23. This figure shows the distance and the strategic value, 
measured by the log of the marginal contribution to open forest if Panama were able to 
achieve comparative advantage in that good.
45 
 
In the case of Panama, products are distant, at least when compared with the product space 
of  countries  such  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  Colombia,  and  especially  China  and 
Malaysia. The products that are closer to the efficiency frontier (inside the rectangle) are 
mostly  tropical  agriculture,  cereals,  chemicals  and  some  machinery  (this  is  of  interest 
because in general in LAC the closer products tend to be commodities).  
 
Even if from a technological point of view moving to new goods seems relatively harder 
for Panama, history suggests the opposite in the case of services. Recent growth in tourism 
and construction has been encouraging. Panama is in the process of becoming an attractive 
destination for second homes, especially among retired Americans. If consolidated, this 
activity could provide more jobs than the previous three leading sectors. The choice of 
strategy has some challenges, due to the competition from other counties in the region, such 
as Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic.  
 
What is really notorious about Panama is the lack of development of non-service sectors. 
Growth in agriculture and manufacturing has been particularly slow, except for bananas 
and, more recently, some tropical fruits. Protectionism is rampant, especially in agriculture 
(cereal, rice, sugar) and in some manufacturing sectors where there is domestic production, 
even  if  the  average  tariff  fell  to  7.3  percent  in  2005  from  12.3  percent  in  1996  after 
Panama’s WTO accession (in 1998).   
 
In a recent study, Yrarrázaval and Martínez (2006) measure levels of effective protection 
for a variety of agricultural products. Poultry has the highest protection (1,658 percent), 
followed by rice (373 percent), sugar (158 percent), potatoes and onions (104 percent and 
143 percent, respectively). Protection is also high for milk and pork (41 and 52 percent, 
respectively).  The  study  argues  that  rice  production  would  not  be  profitable  without 
protection, in part because the high cost of inputs (fertilizers and pesticides). In the case of 
corn production, costs in Panama are significantly higher than in the U.S. (up to three times 
higher  in  the  case  of  the  high-yield  varieties). Trade  liberalization  in  agriculture  could 
stimulate crop conversion into exportable products, such as melons and watermelons (with 
an exports value of US$145 million, 8 times the value observed in 1995). Similar, if not 
more  successful,  examples  are  pineapples,  plantain,  and  ñame.  Although  political 
opposition is stiff, trade liberalization could free the most fertile areas of the country from 
crops that are stagnant and uncompetitive. In addition, these reforms would reduce poverty 
rates, as a result of lower food prices. Finally, demand for unskilled labor would increase as 
a result of the substitution of traditional crops for more labor intensive alternatives.  
 
                                                             
45 Smaller values in the horizontal axis indicate the product is closer to the current basket.  In sum, Panama was successful in identifying its leading sector and to develop other very 
complementary activities such as the CFZ in the late 1940s and the FBC in the early 1970s. 
Recently,  the  process  has  been  reinforced  with  the  expansion  of  tourism.  There  is 
considerable amount on new self discoveries which could be made in the contest of the 
three leading sectors of the economy. The expansion of the Canal is a case in point. But 
there  are  other  possibilities,  such  as  the  financial  sector  where  newer  instruments  and 
services could bring new momentum to this sector. The same can be said of the conversion 
of the CFZ into an export processing zone.   
 
Perhaps the biggest opportunity for Panama in terms of new discoveries is associated with 
the reverted areas from the Canal Zone. In particular, Howard Air Force Base is being 
converted into the Área Económica Especial Panamá-Pacífico, AEEPP, a 2,000 hectares 
area located at the Pacific Ocean entrance of the Canal, very close to the Port of Balboa and 
the city of Panama. It has a 2691 m. airstrip, excellent utilities and communications, in 
addition to a residential area. The current orientation for the development of this area is 
inspired  in  the  Special  Economic  Zones  of  Subic  Bay  in  the  Philipines  and  Penag  in 
Indonesia, which are basically export processing zones with an emphasis in logistics (air 
and maritime transport and telecommunications). Law 41 of 2004 established an integrated 
fiscal, customs, migration and labor framework for this Area. Firms established will have a 
40 year lease, will be exempt from income and VAT taxes, and will operate under a special 
labor regime.
46 Interestingly, experts consider that the key bottleneck is related to the skills 
of the labor force which do not accord entirely with the needs of the economic activities to 
the established within its premises. 
 
 
  Coordination failures: Labor regulation  
 
The  development  of  new  business  opportunities  faces  a  major  obstacle.  As  shown  in 
Table10, firms’ perceptions regarding labor legislation are a great concern. Panama’s labor 
code is very complex: there are more than 100 different laws that regulate specific aspects 
of the labor market. In general, conditions for government employees are very generous, 
while regulations regarding employment in the Canal (PCA) and the CFZ are more flexible. 
In fact, according its organic law, the Panamanian labor code does not apply in the PCA. 
This means that ‘there are excellent salaries, but without bonuses, thirteenth month, and 
right to strikes.’ (See Ahumada, 2001). 
 
The  most  notable  aspects  of  the  labor  code  are  related  to  minimum  wages,  costs  of 
dismissal, vacations (30 days plus an extra monthly salary). According to the World Bank 
(2000), the ratio of days paid to days worked is 1.66 in Panama, 1.26 in México, and 1.34 
in Costa Rica. An important labor market reform was adopted in 1995 during the Pérez 
Balladares  Administration  (1994-1999).  The  reform,  although  incomplete,  lowered 
dismissal  costs  and  was  effective  in  reducing  unemployment  rates  which  had  been 
continuously increasing since 1971.  
                                                             
46 For example, remunerations will be based exclusively according to the number of hours worked, without 
surcharges for work on Sundays and holidays. A reduction in operations will be considered an acceptable 
cause for dismissal.   
The Doing Business report confirms that labor regulation is one the strongest obstacles for 
businesses in Panama. Also, according to the GCR, the difficulties in Panama to hire and 
dismiss workers, restrictions to hire foreign workers and the limited wage flexibility are 
much greater than in the average country in the region. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
according to the WDI indicators from the World Bank, Panama has the most rigid labor 
legislation in the region.  
 
It is also worth looking at the comprehensive measures of labor regulation compiled by 
Botero et al. (2004). In particular, in a sample of 18 Latin American countries shown in 
Table 10, Panama is the second worst performer in several dimensions (in parenthesis the 
worst performer): Dismissal procedures (Mexico), employment laws index (Venezuela), 
old age, disability and death benefits (Mexico), and social security laws index (Colombia). 
It is the third worst performer in collective disputes and in sickness and health benefits. 
Interestingly, Panama is the country (in the group) with lowest labor union power.    
 
Minimum wages play a key role in our diagnostics. Since 1993, minimum wages have 
increased steadily (the ratio of average wages to minimum wages fell from 3.3 in 1993 to 
2.4 in 2004) causing a reduction in employment among the young (15-24 years) and an 
increase in informality. The public sector pays extremely high wages for a given skill level 
(see Galiani, 2006). In fact, the public sector wage premium can be as high as 80 percent 
for low skilled workers. The fact that the wage premium is decreasing in skill level suggests 
that the labor market is highly distorted in the traditional and unskilled labor intensive 
sectors of the economy. In this segment, the lucky ones are those that find a job within the 
public sector. The unlucky are employed in low productivity sectors, such as agriculture 
and manufacturing. 
 
All this evidence seems to point in the same direction. Panama’s labor regulation is a likely 
candidate in order to understand low growth in the traditional sectors, which are more 
adversely  affected  by  high  minimum  wages  and  the  regulations  regarding  dismissal 
procedures. The modern sectors are less affected by these factors. Also, it is common to 
tailor labor regulations to the specific needs of the various modern sectors. For example, 
labor legislation in the PCA and Howard Special Economic Zone is much more flexible. In 
other words, what has been politically viable is to change the labor legislation in specific 
areas and sectors. This may be a second-best strategy, which will not solve the problems oh 
high nonwage labor costs in the traditional sectors. Unsurprisingly, growth in output and 
employment in these sectors has been modest.  
 
Labor  legislation  has  been  difficult  to  reform  mainly  because  the  labor  unions  are 
politically strong (traditionally supporting the ruling PRD party). Much of the emphasis is 
now placed on training programs, rater than labor reform. 
 
 
8.  Growth Diagnostics: Financing  
 
As mentioned before, current account deficits have been relatively common in Panama. The 
natural  implication  is  that  domestic  investment has  been  partially  funded  with  external savings and a sizeable external debt has been built up. In fact, external debt rose from 
around 20 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to 130 percent of GDP in 1989. Although it 
has fallen sin the 1990s (to 66 percent in 2005) it is still high for Latin American standards. 
This is indicative of the fact that Panama has had ample access to foreign capital.  
 
In other words, availability of external financing has not been an issue. Moreover, as we 
mentioned, spreads on sovereign debt have been low, especially when fiscal and current 
account conditions are considered. Low spreads have, in turn, translated into low domestic 
interest rates.  
 
Lack of problems with access to credit is further documented with data from the WBES 
surveys. In the region, on average 65 percent of the firms consider that access to credit is a 
moderate  or  serious  obstacle  for  their  business,  while  only  36  percent  of  the  firms  in 
Panama consider that this is the case (the lowest figure among all the countries in the 
survey). Similarly, all other aspects related to credit, such as paperwork, collateral, and 
corruption in the financial sector) rank better in Panama than in the average Latin American 
country (see Figure 25). However, care should be exercised when interpreting these results 
as they are based on surveys that do not consult the opinion of the more traditional and 
backward sectors. Given more informal evidence, it is likely that these sectors are severely 
constrained in terms of access to credit. 
 
In sum, Panama’s modern sector growth is not constrained by financial development. On 
the contrary, access to long-term low-cost credit is one of its strongest advantages. This, of 
course, does not imply that credit conditions could not improve. This would be the case, for 
example, if the government exercised greater fiscal discipline. 
 
 
9.  Conclusions  
 
Although higher than in the average Latin American country, Panama’s economic growth 
underperforms  relative  to  other  service-based  economies,  such  as  Hong  Kong  and 
Singapore.  The  evidence  presented  in  this  paper,  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  the  existing 
literature, is consistent with the hypothesis that Panama suffers from serious productivity 
problems. In other words, given its level of human and physical capital, output should be 
considerably higher.  
 
Panama has a textbook dual economy. Productivity and salaries are high in the modern 
sectors that demand skilled workers. Surplus labor is employed in the traditional sectors, 
such as agriculture and small-scale manufacturing, where productivity is particularly low. 
Naturally,  this  results  in  considerable  wage  gap  between  the  modern  economy  (which 
includes the public sector) and the rest of the economy. Not surprisingly, Panama has one 
of  the  highest  levels  of  income  and  asset  (especially  human  capital)  inequality  in  the 
continent.  
 
In this context, it is appropriate to apply the GDM separately to the modern and traditional 
sectors.  Our  analysis  suggests  that  growth  in  the  modern  sectors  is  not  particularly constrained. There are some potential restrictions in areas such as infrastructure (mostly in 
electricity) and human capital, but neither of these seems to be currently binding.  
 
The  situation  is  quite  different  in  the  traditional  sectors.  After  analyzing  the  many 
dimensions  of  the  GDM,  we  identified  the  following  constraints,  which  are  ranked 
according to their relevance.  
 
a. There is a clear market failure as production in the traditional economy is highly 
protected through the use of various measures, including tariffs. Entrepreneurs in 
these sectors do not have the incentive to search for new activities. The explanation 
is that surplus labor lowers salaries, while high tariffs keeps prices (and profits) 
high. Protectionism is embedded in Panama’s political system, where these sectors 
exert considerable influence through various means, in order to preserve the status 
quo.  Not  surprisingly,  corruption  is  a  top  concern  according  to  many  business 
surveys. There is no doubt that land and labor could be used more productively in 
other sectors, such as tropical fruits and manufacturing. 
b. Labor  legislation  is  a  major  impediment  for  the  development  of  new  business 
opportunities. Dismissal and overtime costs, minimum wage laws, and the premium 
paid  in  the  public  sector  to  unskilled  workers,  inhibit  potentially  successful 
entrepreneurs from exploring new ventures. 
c. Infrastructure, especially in the non-modern sectors, is also a problem. Electricity 
and transport costs (within the country) restrict business growth. This is particularly 
true for sectors such as modern agriculture and tourism. 
d. There does not seem to be significant problems in terms of appropriability and access 
to credit.  
 
To overcome these problems Panama is following the example of some Asian economies. 
Rather  than  introducing  wide-ranging  reforms,  which  are  politically  unfeasible,  the 
government  has  created  special  economic  zones  that  operate  under  separate  tax,  labor, 
migration and tariff regimes. The Howard Special Economic Zone is a case in point. It is 
likely that under current regulatory conditions, these special economic zones will succeed 
to attract new ventures, especially in export processing, logistics and other services. The 
Panama-U.S. FTA will certainly help in this direction. A similar solution is related to the 
tax incentives given to foreigners who want to settle in Panama (or own second homes). 
Real state, together with tourism, could be the new engines of growth in Panama, with 
greater spillovers than the previous leading sectors. In this sense, the outlook is positive, in 
spite of the lack of growth in agriculture and manufacturing.   
 
However, this may not be the first-best solution to Panama’s growth problems. The Special 
Economic  Zones  are  small  and  can  only  accommodate  a  few  activities.  Rather  than 
following  the  Chinese  mainland  model,  the  entire  country  should  become  a  special 
economic zone in the same spirit of Hong Kong. This would require a comprehensive 
reduction  of  protectionism  and  labor  rigidities,  with  a  clear  gain  in  terms  of  balanced 
growth and equity. This would be particularly important for the agricultural sector, where 
the negotiated FTA with U.S. will phase-out protection only in 20 years. 
    
 
Appendix 1 
Sources of Growth Decomposition 
 
Our methodology closely follows Calderón et al. (2002). The starting point is a Cobb-
Douglas production function of the form:  
( )
      =
1
t t t t t L H K A Y  
Where  t Y  is GDP in year t,  t K  is the stock of physical capital,  t L  is employment,  t H  is 
human capital, and  t A  is TFP. After taking logs and differencing, the function can be 
expressed in growth terms as: 
( )( ) H L K A Y & & & & & +   + + =     1  
Where  X &  is the growth rate of variable  X  and    is the share of capital in total income 
(we use a value equal to 0.35). Human capital is defined as a weighted average of the share 
of the population with a j level of schooling ( j E ):   
  =
j
j j t E w H , 
where the weights are given by the social returns to education for each educational group. 
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Note: A black square indicates products in which Panama has achieved comparative advantage.  
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 Table 1. GDP growth and investment rates: Various countries  
Country Period Average Average Average
Panama 1965-2004 4.22 4.38 1.74 4.18 16.93 4.51
Puerto Rico 1965-2001 8.19 4.02 5.87 3.92 35,3*** 8,47***
Hong Kong, China 1965-2004 6.60 4.62 4.69 4.43 26.78 4.80
Singapur 1965-2004 4.61 2.91 3.35 2.89 19.93 6.93
LAC 1965-2004 3.51 2.60 1.42 2.39 21.32 1.93
*** information is avalible until 1991
Source: WDI 2006, Eclac, and authors' calculations.










Table 2. OLS Regressions  
Log GDP per capita (1960) -0.001*** -0,013*** -0,011*** -0,01*** -0,013*** -0,01***
(0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003)
Log years of schooling (1960) 0,005*** 0,007*** 0,006** 0,005** 0,007*** 0,006**
(0,002) (0,0023) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
% pop. living in temperate zone (1995) 0,017*** 0,013*** 0,017*** 0,017*** 0,013*** 0,017***
(0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,005) (0,004) (0,005)
Executive Constraints (1960-2000) 0,002** 0,002** 0,002**
(0,0008) (0,0008) (0,0008)
Expropriation risk (1982-1997) 0,004*** 0,003***
(0,001) (0,001)
Autocracy (1960-1990) -0,006* -0,005*
(0,003) (0,003)
Dummy Colombia 0.001 0.002 0.0001
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
Dummy Ecuador  -0,003 -0.002 -0,0008
(0,002) (0,002) (0,003)
Dummy Panama 0,008** 0,009*** 0,009**
(0,003) (0,002) (0,003)
Dummy Venezuela -0,008 -0,003 -0,01**
(0,005) (0,004) (0,05)




0.45 0.57 0.45 0.44 0.56
Observations 71 69 71 71 69
***: Significant at 1%
**: Significant at 5%
*: Significant at 10%









 Table 3.  2SLS Growth Regressions. Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2000 








Panel B: First-stage regressions
Dependent Variables
Executive Years of School Expropiation Years of  Schooling Autocracy Years of  Schooling
Share of Population living in temperate zone (1995) -0,96 1,98** 1,35** 1,90** 0.22 1,98**
(0,78) (0,803) (0,65) (0,8) (0,26) (0,803)
Log Settler Mortality -0,67*** -0,90*** -0,29** -0,90*** 0,20*** -0,90***
(0,18) (0,19) (0,15) (0,19) (0,064) (0,19)
Log Population Density in 1500 -0,36*** -0,52*** -0,01*** -0,55*** 0,084* -0,52***
(0,12) (0,129) (0,11) (0,14) (0,043) (0,12)
French Legal Origin -1,79*** -0.79 -0,90** -0,81** 0,25* -0,79*
(0,39) (0,40) (0,33) (0,42) (0,13) (0,40)
Dummy Colombia 2.15 0.06 1.06 0.05 -0,79* 0.06
(1,20) (1,23) (0,99) (1,27) (0,41) (1,23)
Dummy Ecuador 1.03 1.40 0.55 1.41 0.1 1.4
(1,19) (1,22) (0,99) (1,27) (0,41) (1,22)
Dummy Panama 0.34 3,08** 0.067 3,08** 0.06 3,08**
(1,18) (1,21) (0,98) (1,26) (0,408) (1,21)
Dummy Venezuela 1.59 0.07 0.76 0.033 -0,74* 0.066
(1,21) (1,25) (1,00) (1,29) (0,41) (1,25)
R 
2 0.66 0.82 0.57 0.81 0.52 0.82
Observations 47 47 44 44 47 47
***: Significant at 1%
**: Significant at 5%
*: Significant at 10%

















Table 4. Panama: Sources of Growth Decomposition 
Table 4. Panama: Sources of Growth Decomposition
Period Yt Kt Lt Ht At
1964-1970 7.10% 11.25% 3.52% 0.84% 0.33%
1971-1980 4.05% 7.91% 2.21% 2.41% -1.72%
1981-1990 1.36% 1.28% 2.40% 1.72% -1.77%
1991-2000 4.94% 6.19% 3.21% 0.50% 0.36%
2001-2005 4.07% 2.65% 4.14% 0.63% 0.05%
1964-2005 4.13% 5.85% 2.94% 1.32% -0.68%
Period Yt Kt Lt Ht At
1964-1970 7.10% 3.94% 2.29% 0.55% 0.33%
1971-1980 4.05% 2.77% 1.44% 1.57% -1.72%
1981-1990 1.36% 0.45% 1.56% 1.12% -1.77%
1991-2000 4.94% 2.17% 2.09% 0.32% 0.36%
2001-2005 4.07% 0.93% 2.69% 0.41% 0.05%
1964-2005 4.13% 2.05% 1.91% 0.86% -0.68%
Source: Authors' calculations.
Annual growth rates




Table 5.  Managers’ opinions about business environment 
Finance Access 74.8% 25.2% 90.6% 9.4%
Infraestructure Electricity 65.0% 35.0% 55.2% 44.8%
Telecomunications 16.0% 84.0% 35.2% 64.8%
Labor Regulation 80.1% 19.9% 90.7% 9.3%
Quality 71.1% 28.9% 85.7% 14.3%
Confidence in court 
system (c)
60.0% 40.0% 65.3% 34.7%
Corruption 45.9% 54.1% 65.9% 34.1%
Competition Informal competition 51.4% 48.6% 81.3% 18.7%
Others Tax rates 59.9% 40.1% 70.5% 29.5%
Crime 76.5% 23.5% 75.6% 24.4%
Trade regulation 87.9% 12.1% 91.4% 8.6%
Transportation of 
goods and supplies
83.7% 16.3% 88.5% 11.5%
(a) Includes Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia,  Mexico, Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay
Source: World Bank's Enterprise Survey and Authors' calculations.
LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES (a) PANAMA
(c) Based on the question: you Strongly disagree, Tend to disagree, Tend to agree, or Strongly agree with the sentence “The court system is fair, 






(b) In the World Bank's Enterprise Survey classification, a Minimum Obstacle refers to "no obstacle", "minor obstacle" and "moderate obstacle", 























Finance Access 0.0188638 0.0002385 -0.0374084 *** -0.0641953 *** 0.0363291 *** -0.0003208 0.0019184 *** -0.0004614 ** -0.1554408 *** 6123 0.0198
Infraestructure Electricity 0.0787875 *** -0.0073978 0.0232233 * 0.0287098 -0.0114979 -0.0009898 *** 0.0008366 -0.0008638 *** 0.1372001 *** 6215 0.0109
Telecomunication n.d. n.d. 0.0092051 -0.0167935 -0.0184136 -0.0023524 *** 0.0006514 -0.0005304 -0.0675076 ** 1360 0.0026
Labor Regulation -0.0253945 * -0.0004472 -0.0016223 -0.039723 ** 0.0920201 *** 0.0009751 *** 0.0017762 *** -0.0003186 * -0.112216 *** 6182 0.0281
Quality -0.0780577 *** 0.0486833 ** 0.0266769 ** -0.019945 0.1090037 *** 0.0003101 0.001037 ** -0.0009679 *** -0.1536013 *** 6162 0.0316
Confidence in court 
system (d)
0.0304952 * -0.0208972 -0.0139937 -0.0878087 *** 0.0381227 ** -0.0010609 *** 0.0021614 *** 0.0000123 -0.0311167 5894 0.0078
Corruption 0.0174208 0.0372852 * -0.02271 -0.0631019 *** 0.0347263 ** -0.0001458 0.0026409 *** -0.0007478 *** -0.1923421 *** 6102 0.0148
Competition Informal competition 0.0799899 *** 0.0565234 ** -0.0068326 -0.0148619 -0.0554993 *** 0.0008906 ** 0.0025664 *** -0.0001717 -0.2949605 *** 6075 0.0304
Others Tax rates 0.0318638 * 0.0869999 *** -0.0247069 * -0.0486152 ** 0.059823 *** 0.0011126 *** 0.0019297 *** -0.0010578 *** -0.1036103 *** 6179 0.0143
Crime -0.0445292 *** 0.0052422 -0.0161651 -0.0415096 ** -0.0411417 *** 0.000176 -0.0001016 -0.0001621 -0.0026726 6191 0.0061
Trade Regulation -0.0277237 ** 0.0327291 ** -0.0145721 -0.0204506 0.0841202 *** 0.0005069 ** 0.0003908 -0.0000172 -0.0436355 ***
Transportation of goods 
and supplies
-0.0800415 *** -0.0265418 * 0.0275731 *** 0.0250727 * -0.0068379 0.000337 -0.0007873 * -0.0002834 * -0.0594331 *** 6130 0.0142
(a) * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, respectively.
(b) Includes Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia,  Mexico, Panama,  Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay
Source: World Bank's Enterprise Survey and Authors' calculations.
Age Management


























Obstacles associated with (c)
(more than 100 
employees)
(c) In the World Bank's Enterprise Survey classification, a Minimum Obstacle (0 for the probit estimation) refers to "no obstacle", "minor obstacle" and "moderate obstacle" categories, whereas Severe Obstacle (1) refers to "major obstacle" and "very severe obstacle" categories.
Ownership 
concentration Manufacturing Services Medium Large Export
 
 
 Table 7. Returns to Education (Mincer Coefficients) – Urban employees 
Country Año Primary Secondary University Primary Secondary University
Argentina 2005 0.119 0.375 0.623 0.006 0.338 0.609
Bolivia 2003-04 0.025 0.203 1.155 0.148 0.160 1.188
Brazil 2004 0.297 0.364 1.035 0.238 0.370 1.020
Chile 2003 0.132 0.349 0.913 0.120 0.328 0.836
Colombia 2004 0.265 0.309 1.036 0.176 0.411 0.962
Costa Rica 2004 0.145 0.337 1.042 0.146 0.444 0.988
Ecuador 2003 0.197 0.324 0.628 0.190 0.514 0.559
El Salvador 2004 0.086 0.254 0.838 0.161 0.332 0.873
Guatemala 2004 0.287 0.514 0.607 0.234 0.829 0.330
Haiti 2001 -0.029 1.223 0.155 0.657 0.576 0.446
Honduras 2005 0.290 0.696 0.835 0.278 0.698 0.822
Jamaica 2002 0.317 -0.064 0.784 -0.249 0.155 0.947
Mexico 2002 0.168 0.559 0.691 0.133 0.877 0.464
Nicaragua 2001 0.127 0.485 0.921 0.218 0.438 0.640
Panama 2004 0.055 0.376 0.933 0.169 0.606 0.906
Paraguay 2004 0.278 0.321 0.681 0.164 0.493 0.572
Peru 2003 0.149 0.179 0.656 0.285 0.058 0.699
Dominican Republic 2005 0.053 0.269 0.715 0.139 0.304 0.744
Uruguay 2005 0.174 0.502 0.681 0.013 0.504 0.669





Table 8. Inequality in Education in Panama 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Illiteracy rate by income quintiles and 
population aged 9 and over, 1997
Men 19 9 5 3 1
Women 29 10 6 3 1
Average years of schooling by income 
quintiles, 1997 4.2 6.3 7.8 9.3 11.3
Non poor 
population
Urban Rural Total Indigenous
Illiteracy rate of population living in 
poverty by geographical area 3 6 15 27 38
Net primary enrollment rate, 2000 95 91 91 83
Net secondary enrollment rate, 1999 79 19 2
Net tertiary enrollment rate, 1999 31 7 2 3 0
Source: Preal y Cospae (2002).
Poor population
Inequality by quintiles
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Table 9. Panama: Tax Effort in a Regional Context, 1998–2003 1/ 
(Tax revenue in percent of GDP) 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 2/ 21.1 21.2 21.6 21 20 23.3
Barbados ... 30.5 30.2 31.2 31.3 30.9
Bolivia 2/ 19.7 18.6 18.7 18.1 18 18.3
Brazil 2/ 29.8 32.2 33 33.9 35.8 36.1
Chile 16.3 15.6 16.4 17.2 17.6 ...
Colombia 10.5 10 11.2 13.2 13.4 14.1
Costa Rica 2/ ... 11.9 12.4 13.3 13.2 13.1
Dominican Republic 15 14.7 14.8 15.8 16 ...
Ecuador 8.5 8.8 10.9 11 11.1 ...
El Salvador ... 10.2 10.2 10.5 11.1 11.6
Guatemala 8.7 9.3 9.4 9.7 10.6 10.3
Haiti 8.3 8.8 8.1 7.3 8 ...
Honduras 17 17.7 16.6 16.2 15.9 ...
Jamaica 23 24.5 25.7 26.6 24.4 26
Nicaragua 14.9 14.7 13.8 13 13.6 15.1
Panama 10.1 10.6 9.6 8.8 8.6 8.8
Paraguay ... 11.1 11.1 11.3 9.1 9.8
Peru 13.8 12.3 12 12.9 11.9 13
Suriname 23.8 19.8 23.1 33.5 24.5 27.8
Trinidad & Tobago 13.5 12.9 14.5 13.7 15.7 ...
Uruguay 18.3 18.1 17.9 18.6 18.9 ...
Venezuela 12.7 12.1 12.5 11 ... ...
Unweighted average 15.8 15.7 16.1 16.7 16.6 ...
1/ Central government unless otherwise noted.
2/ General government (central and local governments).
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Table 10. Regulation of labor from Botero et al. (2004) 
Dominican Rep. 1.0000 Chile 0.8120 Mexico 0.8571 Venezuela 0.6509
Venezuela 1.0000 Dominican Rep. 0.7458 Panama 0.8571 Panama 0.6246
Ecuador 0.2574 Venezuela 0.6663 Peru 0.8571 Dominican Rep. 0.5972
Bolivia 0.2206 Panama 0.6320 Brazil 0.5714 Mexico 0.5943
Brazil 0.1529 Brazil 0.6087 Ecuador 0.5714 Brazil 0.5676
Mexico 0.1258 Peru 0.6049 Argentina 0.2857 Chile 0.4735
Uruguay 0.1112 Colombia 0.5488 Chile 0.2857 Peru 0.4630
Chile 0.0775 Bolivia 0.5207 Colombia 0.2857 Ecuador 0.3966
Argentina 0.0676 Mexico 0.4255 Dominican Rep. 0.1429 Bolivia 0.3728
Peru 0.0461 Ecuador 0.3203 Bolivia 0.0000 Colombia 0.3442
Colombia 0.0424 Argentina 0.2734 Jamaica  0.0000 Argentina 0.3442
Panama 0.0406 Uruguay 0.2438 Uruguay 0.0000 Uruguay 0.2762
Jamaica  0.0000 Jamaica  0.1512 Venezuela 0.0000 Jamaica  0.1628
Labor union power Collective disputes Collective relations laws index
Peru 0.7143 Ecuador 0.7500 Peru 0.7113
Argentina 0.5714 Peru 0.7083 Ecuador 0.6369
Mexico 0.5714 Panama 0.6250 Argentina 0.5774
Venezuela 0.5714 Argentina 0.5833 Mexico 0.5774
Ecuador 0.5238 Mexico 0.5833 Venezuela 0.5357
Chile 0.4286 Bolivia 0.5417 Colombia 0.4851
Colombia 0.4286 Colombia 0.5417 Bolivia 0.4613
Bolivia 0.3810 Venezuela 0.5000 Panama 0.4554
Brazil 0.3810 Brazil 0.3750 Chile 0.3810
Dominican Rep. 0.3343 Uruguay 0.3750 Brazil 0.3780
Uruguay 0.3333 Chile 0.3333 Uruguay 0.3542
Jamaica  0.2857 Dominican Rep. 0.2088 Dominican Rep. 0.2715
Panama 0.2857 Jamaica  0.1667 Jamaica  0.2262
Mexico 0.7223 Argentina 0.9364 Colombia 0.9972 Colombia 0.8131
Panama 0.6983 Bolivia 0.8780 Argentina 0.8372 Panama 0.7431
Colombia 0.6547 Panama 0.8644 Uruguay 0.7842 Venezuela 0.7299
Venezuela 0.6542 Venezuela 0.8401 Chile 0.7818 Argentina 0.7154
Ecuador 0.6357 Dominican Rep. 0.8370 Venezuela 0.6953 Chile 0.6887
Dominican Rep. 0.6258 Peru 0.8185 Panama 0.6667 Uruguay 0.6778
Jamaica  0.5030 Mexico 0.7965 Brazil 0.5634 Ecuador 0.6542
Uruguay 0.5021 Chile 0.7892 Ecuador 0.5383 Brazil 0.5471
Brazil 0.5001 Ecuador 0.7887 Bolivia 0.0000 Mexico 0.5063
Chile 0.4951 Colombia 0.7873 Dominican Rep. 0.0000 Dominican Rep. 0.4876
Peru 0.4316 Uruguay 0.7470 Jamaica  0.0000 Peru 0.4167
Argentina 0.3725 Brazil 0.5777 Mexico 0.0000 Bolivia 0.3702
Bolivia 0.2326 Jamaica  0.0000 Peru 0.0000 Jamaica  0.1677
* See original paper for the specific definition of each index. Source: Botero  et al.  (2004). 
Cost of increasing hours worked Cost of firing workers Dismissal procedures Employment laws index
Old age, disability and death 
benefits 
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Figure 1.  Panama Canal: contribution to central government revenues 


















Source: Contraloría General 
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Source: Superiontendency of Banks, SBP.
Foreign deposits (% of total)
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Hong Kong (CPI, WDI)*
* Bilateral (US). ** Multilateral. Source: IMF  48 
Figure 7. Labor productivities  
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Figure 8. Labor productivities in Panama, Hong Kong and Singapore (Real GDP per 








































Source: WDI, ILO and Author's calculations.
Source: WDI, ILO and Author's calculations.
(*) Services include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), 
transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health 
Total
 Agriculture and Industry sectors *
(*) Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock 
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Figure 10. Panama and LAC: GDP growth and per capita GDP growth - 1951-2005 
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Note: Minimum period between structural breaks was set to h= 8 years. Dashed lines indicates the presence of an upbreak in the 
series.Source: Author's calculations based on data from ECLAC.
 
 












Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Tertiary school enrollment,  2004
** 2003 for Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Source: WDI  
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1,400 EMBI+ Colombia spread EMBI+ Mexico spread EMBI+ Panama spread
EMBI+ spread EMBI+ Chile
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Note: Blue dots represent estimates for the 2005 governance indicators. The thin vertical lines represent standard errors around these estimates for each country in world-wide sample. Black dot represents the 
chosen year comparator (if any). To add or delete countries from the chart, click on the "Country Selection" tab below. Source: Kaufman et. al.(2005).
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Figure 20. EXPY vs. GDP per capita, 2003 
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Index of concentration of Exports





Includes products whose value exceeds $ 100 .000  or 0.3% of total exports. Source: UNCTAD.
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Source: Hausmann and Klinger’s database and calculations. 
 
 
Figure 23. Panama’s open forest, 2005. Proximity vs. Strategic Value 
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Closer (i.e. using more of the 
country’s existing capabilities)
Higher Strategic Value (would lead to a larger increase in open forest)  61 
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Figure 25. Access to credit  
 
 
How problematic are the following financing issues for the operation and growth of 
your business? Q1.Collateral requirements of banks and financial institutions.  Q2. 
Paperwork.  Q3. High interest rates.  Q4. Need special connections with banks.  Q5. 
Banks lack money to lend.  Q5. Banks lack money to lend.  Q6. Corruption of bank 
officials.  Q7. Lack access to foreign banks.  Q8. Lack access to equity partners.  Q9. 
Lack access to export finance.  Q10. Lack access to lease finance.  Q11. Inadequate 












How problematic is getting financing (% of responses  - moderate 
obstacle+serious obstacle)
Source: WBES.
 
 
 
 
 
 